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State Finance in Times of Crisis
Brian Galle*& Jonathan Klick†
Abstract
As recent events illustrate, state finances are pro-cyclical: during recessions, state
revenues crash, worsening the effects of economic downturns. This problem is well-known, yet
persistent. We argue here that, in light of predictable federalism and political economy
dynamics, states will be unable to change this situation on their own. Additionally, we note that
many possible federal remedies may result in worse problems, such as creating moral hazard that
would induce states to take on excessively risky policy, both fiscal and otherwise. Thus, we
argue that policy makers should consider so-called “automatic” stabilizers, such as are found in
the federal tax system.
We present an argument from micro-economic foundations suggesting that the federal
Alternative Minimum Tax has potentially salutary -- and heretofore unrecognized -- effects that
counteract pathologies of state budgets over the business cycle. Namely, as incomes grow and
the AMT hits more state residents, state spending becomes more expensive in flush times as the
federal tax subsidy for state and local taxes is reduced. Conversely, when state fiscal health
deteriorates, the federal tax subsidy grows as fewer state residents fall under the AMT, boosting
taxpayer support for state spending. This stabilizing mechanism has the potential to overcome
problems state politicians face committing to saving during boom times and spending during
bust times. We present empirical evidence suggesting that the AMT does indeed provide some
degree of fiscal stabilization in accordance with micro-theory. We provide policy suggestions
regarding how the AMT could be modified to leverage this stabilization effect.
Calls to “reform” the Alternative Minimum Tax pre-date the recent economic downturn.
AMT reform has appeared in many congressional stimulus proposals, but significant cut-backs
are unlikely as federal deficits are projected to grow for the foreseeable future. Our argument
here implies that any AMT reform effort should consider whether the AMT’s stabilizer function
could be replaced by any other viable mechanism.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Economic downturns make for tough fiscal times for state and local governments.1 State
fiscal belt-tightening has the potential to drive up unemployment and drive down consumer
demand, further slowing the economy.2 As we write during the summer of 2009, we see a steady
stream of headlines warning that state budget cuts threaten to delay economic recovery.3 The
crisis underscores that any sensible strategy for managing the ups and downs of the business
cycle should include some provision for ensuring that state revenues will ease the pain of
recessions and slowdowns, rather than compounding it.4
In this Article, we argue that states are poorly situated to make such plans for themselves,
and that many conventional forms of federal subsidy would risk worsening the problems that
states face. However, the path to a well designed subsidy already has been laid in a surprising
place: the federal Alternative Minimum Tax.5 We investigate empirically the impact of the

1

Yilin Hou, Fiscal Reserves and State Own-Source Expenditure in Downturn Years, 33 PUB. FIN. REV. 117, 123
(2005); David Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2609--10 (2005). For a recent
empirical demonstration of this point, see Erik Wibbels & Jonathan Rodden, Fiscal Decentralization and the
Business Cycle: An Empirical Study of Eight Federations, 21 J. ECON. & POL. __ (forthcoming 2010), manuscript at
2.
2
Yilin Hou, Budgeting for Fiscal Stability Over the Business Cycle: A Countercyclical Fiscal Policy and the
Multiyear Perspective on Budgeting, PUB. ADMIN. REV. 730, 733 (Sept/Oct. 2006); Wibbels & Rodden, supra note
1, at 2.
3
Michael Cooper, States Face Difficult Decisions, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 19, 2009, at A17; Editorial: States in
Distress, NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 4, 2009, at A22; State Budgets in Crisis: Happy New Year, THE ECONOMIST, July
4, 2009, at 74.
4
Surprisingly, study of the management of the business cycle, known as “macroeconomic” policy, is almost wholly
absent from the legal literature. Jeff Strnad’s essay discusses the general macroeconomic implications of the tax
code. Jeff Strnad, Some Macroeconomic Interactions with Tax Base Choice, 56 SMU L. REV. 171, 181--99 (2003).
Lily Batchelder and her colleagues have analyzed the macroeconomic and other properties of refundable tax credits,
but found macroeconomic considerations relatively unimportant. Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax
Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 61--65 (2006). David Super considers state
stabilization efforts as a part of his larger analysis of fiscal ties between the federal government and the states.
Super, supra note 1, at 2610--14, 2632--37. And, in an important recent manuscript, Yair Listokin sets out more
comprehensively the significance of federal tax policy for national business cycles. Yair Jason Listokin, Tax
Expenditures and Business Cycle Fluctuations, Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 378 (April 3, 2009),
available at < http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1372782>.
5
T.C. §§ 55--58. For an overview of the AMT’s complex provisions, see JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION,
PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX 1--7 (June 27, 2007).
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AMT, and suggest some modest alterations that would make it a more effective stabilizer for
unsteady state economies.
The Article makes three key contributions to the literature, as well as some smaller ones.
First, we show for the first time empirically that the AMT affects state spending and also
demonstrate that this effect is counter-cyclical. Second, we add to a minute legal literature
exploring stabilization policy at the state level, as well as considering the impact state policy has
on the cycles of national economic health.6 And, thirdly, we attempt to remedy the neglect, in
the legal literature and elsewhere, of how to design a federal policy that would mitigate the
negative business-cycle effects of state budgeting.7
Turning to the substance of our argument, the standard goal of macroeconomic policy in
general is to be “countercyclical,” moderating both booms and busts in the economy.8 The
market may not automatically self-correct, and extremes in either direction can lead to unwanted
effects, whether it be job loss or excessive inflation.9 During downturns, this means that
government has a role to play in stimulating the economy, such as through increased spending,
tax cuts, or expansionary monetary policy.10 Traditional microeconomic theory also offers
similar proscriptions, counseling that transfers of wealth from richer periods (booms) to poorer
periods (busts) increases overall social welfare.11

6

Our only antecedent here is Super, supra note 4, at 2610--14, 2632--37.
Again, the only other effort we are aware of is a brief passage in Super, supra note 4, at 2650--51, and an
unpublished essay by the economist Marianne Vigneault, who studied the stabilization properties of alternative
possible versions of Canada’s revenue-sharing system. Marianne Vigneault, The Role of Intergovernmental
Transfers in Regional Stabilization and Equalization 10--15 (unpublished manuscript, Feb. 2002), available at
<http://www.aucc.ca/_pdf/english/programs/cepra/Final%20Paper%20-%20Literature%20Reviw%20by%20Vigneault.pdf>.
8
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 88--89 (5th ed. 1991).
Macroeconomics is the study of whole economies, while microeconomics is the study of individual and group
behavior. Id. at 76--77.
9
DAVID ROMER, ADVANCED MACROECONOMICS 217-322 (2d ed. 2001).
10
Id. at 494--97.
11
We explain this theory in more detail infra Part II.
7
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States are in a difficult bind when it comes to stabilization policy, however. Their
revenues are tied to the business cycle, so that budgets get tighter just when the need for
countercyclical spending increases.12 Raising taxes to make ends meet is contrary to the usual
macroeconomic proscription, and is especially difficult in a modern climate where tax increases
drive away productive citizens and businesses. Whereas Congress can largely avoid this
dilemma simply by borrowing, states risk driving out citizens with excessive debt, and nearly all
state legislatures face legal constraints to maintain a balanced budget. Those legal constraints,
moreover, are sensible responses to the incentives of legislatures in prosperous times, who would
otherwise likely take on excessive debts.13
The result is that state finances tend to contribute to, rather than mitigate, the pain of
economic downturns.14 And in a world where states are so closely economically interdependent,
these effects are felt well outside any one state’s borders.15 As recent events illustrate, state
budget crises contribute to national economic woes.16
Accordingly, we argue that the federal government can play some role in stabilizing state
budgets, leading us to the question of how best to design such an intervention. Simply shifting
some countercyclical programs, such as unemployment insurance, to the federal budget would be
somewhat helpful (albeit at some cost to federalism), but would lead to undesirable distortions in
12

Brian Knight & Arik Levinson, Fiscal Institutions in U.S. States, in INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND FISCAL POLICY
167, 176--80 (Rolf R. Strauch & Jurgen von Hagen eds., 2000); Russell S. Sobel & Randall G. Holcombe, The
Impact of State Rainy Day Funds in Easing State Fiscal Crises During the 1990-1991 Recession, PUB. BUDGETING
& FIN. 28, 28 (Fall 1996); Wibbels & Rodden, supra note 1, at 16--18, 22; David Wildasin, State and Local
Government Finance in the Current Crisis: Time for Emergency Federal Relief?, IFIR Working Paper No. 2009-07,
at 1, available at <http://www.ifigr.org/publication/ifir_working_papers/IFIR-WP-2009-07.pdf>.
13
We detail the preceding points infra Part III.
14
International Monetary Fund, Decentralization and Macroeconomic Management, IMF Working Paper No.
WP/97/155, at 7 (Nov. 1997); Hou, supra note 2, at 733; Wibbels & Rodden, supra note 1, at 2--3.
15
Robert P. Inman, Transfers and Bailouts: Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline with Lessons from U.S. Federalism,
in FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 35, 42--43 (Jonathan Rodden
et al. eds., 2003).
16
Wildasin, supra note 12, at 12; see also Tamim Bayoumi & Barry Eichengreen, Restraining Yourself: The
Implications of Fiscal Rules for Economic Stabilization, 42 STAFF PAPERS -- INT’ MONETARY FUND 32, 46 (1995)
(“[S]tate budgets played a significant role in macroeconomic stabilization in the 1970s and 1980s….”).
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state policymakers’ incentives. Discretionary grants to hard-hit states are unappealing, because
they may be too slow and targeted more by politics than economic needs. On the other extreme,
a steady-state subsidy for state revenues --- say, federal revenue-sharing along the lines of the
Canadian model --- contributes to overheating the economy during growth periods, and distorts
state budgets upward. The ideal instrument, then, is one that automatically directs federal dollars
to a state if and only if its economy is struggling.
The federal tax system already contains a set of instruments that approximate this ideal.
The Tax Code grants state taxpayers a deduction for the money they pay to their local
government, which, in effect, is a federal matching grant for eligible state levies.17 The muchreviled Alternative Minimum Tax, as we will both model and support with original empirical
evidence, acts to shut off this matching grant when state economies are thriving. In combination,
these provisions and others help target federal dollars to struggling states.
In light of the present crisis, we obviously do not claim that this support mechanism
functions perfectly. Realistically, no stabilization policy could entirely protect states from a
recession of this magnitude, but we acknowledge several current aspects of the AMT that likely
reduce its efficacy. Thus, we also suggest several policy tweaks, some at the federal level, some
that could simply be adopted by states, that would make better use of the support offered by the
Tax Code.
Overall, we find that the literature’s neglect of stabilization policy has been unfortunate,
because it has led to the entrenchment of several pieces of conventional wisdom we think need
reconsideration. Perhaps most prominent is the canard that states should not raise taxes during

17

T.C. § 164.
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downturns, repeated recently during California’s 2009 budget crisis.18 In fact, taking into
account federal matching grants, raising tax rates can actually, on net, increase a state’s wealth.
At the same time, we show that the most effective political structure for tax increases may be to
tax the middle class.
Part II of the Article offers more background on the rationale for government
interventions in the business cycle. Part III explains why states cannot themselves establish
effective countercyclical taxing and spending policies. Part IV elaborates on why standard forms
of federal subsidy also are suspect. Part V models the potential power of the AMT to serve as a
countercyclical federal subsidy, and sets out some empirical support for our basic assumption
that AMT liability at the jurisdiction level is rising in state income. Part VI presents the results
of our empirical investigation into the stabilizing effects of the AMT. Part VII suggests some
policies to improve the AMT’s countercyclical effects. We then conclude.
II. MICRO-FOUNDATIONS OF AMT’s STABILIZATION EFFECT
The primary arguments for counter-cyclical fiscal policy can be broadly characterized as
social insurance arguments and macroeconomic stimulus arguments. Although our general idea
can apply in both domains, we will focus exclusively on the social insurance aspects of countercyclical fiscal policy.19 The value of social insurance, or any insurance for that matter, hinges on

18

Jim Sanders, California Legislature: One Month to Battle Over Slew of Bills, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 16, 2009,
at A1. In earlier recessions, governors pushed for needed tax increases, only to be punished by their electorates.
Super, supra note 1, at 2613 n.267.
19
There is significant disagreement among macroeconomists about the efficacy of using fiscal policy to stimulate
economic growth. There are credible camps supporting the view that stimulus is not generally welfare improving,
that fiscal policy is effective but inferior to using monetary policy to stimulate the economy and improve welfare,
Christina Romer, Changes in Business Cycles: Evidence and Explanations, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 23, 23--24, 36--37
(1999), and that fiscal policy is the only option to stimulate an economy and improve welfare in a liquidity trap
where monetary policy is impotent. Even within the last camp, there is disagreement as to whether spending
increases or tax cuts are more effective as stimulus tools. [cites] To avoid these very complicated debates, we focus
on the social insurance aspects of counter-cyclical fiscal policy, simply noting that the AMT’s stabilization effects
could be important in models that allow for fiscal policy to have a stimulus effect.
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the notion that individuals experience diminishing marginal utility of income. That is, as an
individual consumes additional units of a good, each increment of the good contributes less to
the individual’s utility than the previous one did.20 An immediate consequence of this
diminishing marginal utility of income is that individuals can improve their welfare by foregoing
small amounts of income during good times (by paying an insurance premium) in the expectation
that they will receive a relatively large transfer during bad times (i.e., when the event that was
insured against occurs).21
In the social insurance context, the government body taxes individuals in relatively good
financial conditions to provide transfers to individuals who have suffered some economic loss.22
These transfers are often referred to as fiscal “smoothing,” because they level out the peaks and
valleys of lifetime earnings.23 Social insurance programs may prove to be superior to privately
provided insurance if they allow for larger pools in which to diversify the underlying risk, or if
there is adverse selection due to information asymmetries about the underlying risk each person
faces.24 As a descriptive matter, social insurance is generally provided with respect to income
losses resulting from involuntary unemployment25 or more general problems leading to poverty26

Even for those readers more interested in macroeconomics per se, our discussion should still be pertinent,
since recipients of social insurance have a high marginal propensity to consume, and hence are important targets of
fiscal stimulus. Strnad, supra note 4, at 195.
20
Sometimes referred to as the “Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility,” this phenomenon can be modeled using a
concave utility function which is the standard modeling assumption in economics. See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET
AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 185 (1995).
21
MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 20, 187-188.
22
It will be useful to distinguish between social insurance and redistribution. Social insurance is aimed at mitigating
temporary downturns in an individual’s income, whereas redistribution attempts to level the amount of lifetime
resources the individual has access to. Martin Feldstein, Rethinking Social Insurance, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 2--3
(2005). However, at a general level, redistribution can be seen as a form of social insurance.
23
E.g., James Poterba & Jurgen von Hagen, Introduction, in FISCAL INSTITUTIONS AND FISCAL PERFORMANCE 1, 5
(James Poterba & Jurgen von Hagen eds., 1999).
24
Feldstein, supra note 22, at 4. Cite to adverse selection article; note that social insurance necessarily generates
cross subsidization in this context though, under a veil of ignorance, individuals may support such cross-subsidies.
25
Beyond private insurance markets, there is evidence that public provision of unemployment insurance crowds out
additional income production in the family and precautionary savings. See Julie Cullen & Jonathan Gruber, Does
Unemployment Insurance Crowd Out Spousal Labor Supply?, 18 J. LAB. ECON. 546 (2000); Eric M. Engen &
Jonathan Gruber, Unemployment Insurance and Precautionary Saving, 47 J. MON. ECON. 545 (2001).
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to the near exclusion of private insurance. Social insurance programs, generally targeted at the
chronically poor or elderly populations, also exist in the health insurance market27 alongside
private competitors. More limited social insurance programs include food stamps and subsidized
housing.28
Individuals may unanimously “agree” to these social insurance programs in some
idealized state behind what Buchanan and Tullock call a state of uncertainty29 or what Rawls
dubs the veil of ignorance30 wherein an individual does not know what characteristics or
preferences she will be endowed with later. However, once they find themselves in a position
where they pay more into these programs than they expect to receive, support may decline.
Worse yet, this decrease in support may coincide with instances when the need for the social
insurance is greatest, such as times of economic contraction. Absent some strong institutional
commitments, politicians may be hesitant to collect taxes from individuals who are relatively
well off to help the less well off, especially if the former are more likely to vote than the latter.31
Perversely, when the economic condition is at its best, people may be most willing to pay taxes
to pay for the social insurance. Technically speaking, social insurance (and public goods more
generally) are normal goods, implying that the willingness to pay for them is increasing in
income.32

26

See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber and Daniel M. Hungerman, Faith-Based Charity and Crowd Out During the Great
Depression, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 1043 (2007).
27
Although there is evidence of crowd out here as well. See David M. Cutler and Jonathan Gruber, Does Public
Insurance Crowd Out Private Insurance, 111 Q. J. ECON. 391 (1996).
28
7 U.S.C. § 2015 (food stamps); U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., HOME and Low Income Housing Tax Credits
(LIHTC) (Aug. 30, 2004), available at http:// www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/training/web/lihtc/
29
JAMES M. BUCHANAN AND GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 77 (1962).
30
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (1971).
31
A number of studies find this effect. See, e.g., Richard J. Timpone, Structure, Behavior, and Voter Turnout in the
United States, 92 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 145, 149--153 (1998).
32
See, e.g., Daniel Hewitt, Demand for National Public Goods: Estimates from Surveys, 23 ECON. INQ. 487 (2007).
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If government institutions, in our case state and local government institutions, were
disciplined enough to save in the good times and spend in the bad times, they could engage in
fiscal smoothing. Advocates of smoothing have championed rainy day funds on these grounds,
but they have largely ineffective because relatively few have strong deposit and withdrawal
rules.33 Given the lack of binding institutional commitments and short time horizons on the part
of politicians, the more common pattern is for state and local governments to spend more during
good times and less during bad times.34
In the following Parts, we analyze in more detail the causes for state failures to provide
anywhere near optimal amounts of fiscal smoothing, and evaluate several possible solutions to
this problem.
III. Weakness of State Stabilization Tools
In this Part we explore the many failures of state financing in times of economic trouble.
State governments have a large influence, for good or ill, on public efforts to smooth incomes
over time.35 But, as we have noted, studies have also shown that state spending tends to fall just
at those times it would be most needed.36 There are no viable state-level solutions to this
problem. States might make up for revenue shortfalls by raising taxes, borrowing, or drawing
from existing savings. As we argue in the ensuing subparts, however, these options are
normatively unattractive, descriptively unlikely as a political matter, or both.
A. Tax Rate Increases
33

Gary A. Wagner & Russell S. Sobel, State Budget Stabilization Fund Adoption: Preparing for the Next Recession
or Circumventing Fiscal Restraints?, 126 PUB. CHOICE 177, 180--85 (2006); Sobel & Holcombe, supra note 12, at
28. .
34
Wibbels & Rodden, supra note 1, at 22 (“Pro-cyclicality is the rule among provinces and states in federations.”).
35
Bayoumi & Eichengreen, supra note 16, at 46; Edward M. Gramlich, Subnational Fiscal Policy, in PERSPECTIVES
ON LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 3, 4--5 (John M. Quigley ed., 1987); Arik Levinson, Balanced
Budgets and Business Cycles: Evidence from the States, 51 NAT’L TAX J. 715, 716 (1998); Wibbels & Rodden,
supra note 1, at 6, 8--9 (noting that federal efforts to smooth incomes can be “completely undone by the need for
provincial governments to raise taxes or cut expenditures because of flagging revenues”).
36
See sources cited supra note 14.
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One obvious cure for declines in state tax revenues is for the state to increase tax rates to
make up for the shortfall. At a minimum, if the state sets rates to bring in the same amount of
total revenue, it can avoid spending cuts. Of course, this would only be an attractive strategy if
the stimulative effect of the state’s spending was greater than the drag on the economy caused by
the tax. For several reasons, it is likely that tax increases, in the absence of any federal subsidy,
will be on net a bad move economically for the state and politically for the state’s officials.
First, tax rates should be kept smooth over time in order to minimize welfare losses. In
brief, the size of the welfare loss from a tax increases exponentially as the tax rate goes up, so
that a tax of 0% one year and 20% the next is much worse than a steady tax of 10% each year.37
If revenue needs increase unexpectedly, the state should borrow, which allows it to spread the
cost of meeting the need more evenly over time.38
States are also constrained in their ability to raise taxes for income smoothing by the
possibility that individuals and businesses may exit the state in response to tax rate increases.
Residents who do not receive social insurance payments may perceive transfers as losses.39 Exit
is important because voters often free ride on another’s effort to oppose undesirable policy.40
37

The normative appeal of rate smoothing derives from the way taxes distort economic behavior. When taxes rise,
some productive exchanges do not occur: the equilibrium point shifts to the left on a standard supply/demand curve,
leaving a triangular area representing lost welfare gains. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note Error! Bookmark
not defined., at 235--36, 279--95. The welfare losses that result can be calculated by the standard geometric
formula for the area of a triangle, 1/2bh, implying that the loss rises in proportion to the square of the size of the
distortion. Id. at 281.
38
Robert Barro, On the Determination of the Public Debt, 87 J. POL. ECON. 940, 940--71 (1979). For instance,
instead of hiking rates from 10 to 20% for one year, it might instead borrow, and increase rates to 11% for ten years
to pay off the debt. Again, because of the exponential relationship between tax rates and welfare losses, this move
would increase the overall welfare of the state.
39
See Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Redistribution, 104 J.
POL. ECON. 979, 988 (1996) (assuming that individuals who are less exposed to risk will prefer lower amounts of
social insurance); Wibbels & Rodden, supra note 1, at 7.
40
E.g., Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for PrincipalAgent Slack in Political Institutions, 33 J.L. & ECON. 103, 103--04, 107--08 (1990). Some scholars argue that
political conditions in select local governments mitigate this problem. For instance, suburban homeowners in a
given jurisdiction may all have relatively similar preferences for the few services their government provides, and
their social and geographic proximity may encourage collective action. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER
HYPOTHESIS 73--76 (2001). But this is not true of more diverse jurisdictions, such as states, rural counties, suburbs
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But because a neighbor’s exit does little to preserve the value of one’s own home, potential
migrants are rather less inclined to free ride than voters.41 Thus, exit is not subject to the same
degree of collective action problems as voting.42 States may be able to extract redistributive
taxes up to the exit costs of each taxpayer,43 but in many cases states have already made binding
commitments to mobile taxpayers not to exact the full exit cost, and those commitments by
definition are costly to escape.44 The federal government generally does not face these problems,
because the costs of exiting the United States are typically prohibitively high.45
The exit option also compounds the usual political dilemma of tax rate increases. At the
state, as at the national level, there will special-interest group conflict over the tax/spending
tradeoff. Beneficiaries of stabilizing transfer payments can form a coherent group to defend and

that welcome many new migrants, or large cities. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism, Part II: Localism and Legal
Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 400--422 (1990). Even within suburbs, residents may overcome free riding only
on issues of special importance to a subset of the whole population, making monitoring haphazard and contingent on
the alignment of monitor interests with government performance on that narrow issue. Cf. Jean Tirole, The Internal
Organization of Government, 46 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 1, 3--4 (1994) (describing difficulties of monitoring entity
that performs variety of services and may succeed at some and fail at others).
41
See Clayton Gillette, Can Public Debt Enhance Democracy?, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 937, 965--66 (2008).
42
Id.
43
See Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution, Living Wage Ordinances, and Judicial Intervention, 101
N’WESTERN UNIV. L REV. 1057, 1082--84 (2007); Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention,
69 VA. L. REV. 563, 571-72, 601 (1983). Note that this implies that states with larger locational surplus -- generally
denser-populated and more urban jurisdictions -- will be more capable of stabilization spending.
44
Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 235-36
(1985).
45
In theory states could overcome the exit problem by coordinated action, but both theory and observation suggest
that will be rare. If all states face equal need for stabilization spending, and all raise taxes together, the exit dilemma
disappears, because no state is more or less of a bargain than it was before the crisis. That is an extreme and
implausible scenario, but it may retain a significant grain of truth regionally. See Ravi Kanbur & Michael Keen,
Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size, 83 AM. ECON. REV.
877, 879--81 (1993). If neighboring states are affected in relatively similar fashion, and relocating out of the
affected region is expensive, then only clusters of states need act together, rather than all fifty at once.
Still, most scholars believe that coordinated tax raising will be rare, because the benefits of defection are
high. This dynamic produces a prisoner’s dilemma in which states must cut taxes to attract mobile taxpayers, even
if that strategy loses revenues. Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE
L.J. 965, 1025--26 (1998); Kelly Edmiston, Strategic Apportionment of the State Corporate Income Tax, 55 NAT’L
TAX J. 239, 239--62 (2002). These theories have some empirical support. Robert C. Turner & Mark Cassell, Racing
to the Bottom at Different Speeds? The Impact of Intra-State Competition on Abatement Generosity in Ohio
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expand their entitlement, just as the small group of wealthy taxpayers may overcome free-rider
dynamics to lobby against rate hikes.46 What changes at the local level is that mobile taxpayers
have the additional lever of the threat of their departure. Exit would not only deprive the official
of revenue for her own goals, but also jeopardize her reelection by sending a potential negative
signal to the remaining citizens about the quality of her performance.47 Thus, taxpayers who can
make at least a credible exit threat will likely be disproportionately powerful in resisting local tax
increases.48 Again, there are many more of those taxpayers at the local than at the national level.
B. Borrowing
An obvious alternative to tax hikes for revenue-starved states is borrowing. Public
borrowing can take on a variety of forms, ranging from a straightforward bank loan to the sale of
bonds of various kinds.49 Borrowing, too, however, may be both normatively undesirable and
practically difficult.
1. Exit Pressures on Local Borrowing
On the practical side, just as the possibility of exit constrains state tax levels, so too does
it limit states’ opportunity to borrow.50 Indeed, under some conditions there is no difference
between taxes and debt. After all, debts are simply promises to pay, which must be financed
with future taxes. For a local resident who is fully aware of the extent of the public debt, expects
to be around for the term of the repayment, and has a personal discount rate that matches the
46
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47
See GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE FISCAL
CONSTITUTION 178 (1980).
48
See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition:
Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 264--65 (1997); Clayton P. Gillette, Can
Public Debt Enhance Democracy?, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 937, 966 (2008).
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market rate, these future promises to pay should be perfectly equivalent to a current tax
obligation.51 This principle is known to economists as “Ricardian equivalence.”52 Assuming,
then, that Ricardian equivalence holds, states cannot mitigate exit pressure by financing their
expenditures through debt rather than current tax increases.
On the other hand, both theory and evidence suggest that perfect Ricardian equivalence is
rare.53 Taxpayers may rationally conclude that they will die or move before current debts are
fully paid. If the local economy recovers and then expands, the taxpayers may be wealthier in
the future than they are now, making the future payment of tax less painful than it is now when
the taxpayers are relatively poorer. The taxpayers may have a higher discount rate than the
market rate of interest, so that they value current expenditures more than the discounted present
value of the future stream of interest payments. The state government might repudiate its debts,
or be bailed out by the federal government. And imperfectly informed taxpayers may not even
be aware that the burden of debt service will be equivalent to a current tax increase.
Notwithstanding this intuitive critique, empirical studies of whether equivalence exists produce
widely divergent results.54
Even if Ricardian equivalence is incomplete, future debt can still lead to high exit
pressure due to its effect on housing prices.55 Because the price of a home reflects the net value
of living in it, future tax obligations should depress home values by their proportionate
51
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discounted present value, a process known as “capitalization.”56 As a result of capitalization, a
state’s future loan obligations reduce the present wealth of its residents, even those who would
otherwise have heavily discounted the burden of that debt.57 Knowing this, residents might flee
or threaten to flee a jurisdiction that was considering taking on new debt.58
2. Political Economy of Local Debt
Even if Ricardian equivalence and capitalization are both incomplete, the very factors
that permit a state to borrow during downturns also may make borrowing at the state level
normatively unattractive. Distortions in the political process may result in excess borrowing
during both bad times and good. On net, the cost of these distortions may well outweigh any
benefits that would accrue from unconstrained debt-financed stimulus. In theory, what is needed
is a mechanism to ease borrowing in lean times and constrain it at others. As we will sketch
shortly, however, it is difficult to design effective legal or institutional limits on state borrowing,
let alone limits fine-tuned enough to be turned on or off at the right times.
One well-known set of reasons for excess borrowing is tied to the incentive structure of
rational voters. Again, it is rational for some voters to conclude that they will not ultimately be
obliged to pay off all of the debt their jurisdiction occurs. Any given voter might die or move
before the balance comes fully due.59 If capitalization is incomplete, even homeowners can
escape the jurisdiction without bearing the costs of the government’s debts, and renters (or those
who live free in someone else’s home, such as voting-age children) can likely escape it in any
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event.60 Thus, there is an inter-temporal fiscal externality, in which present voters do not take
fully into account the costs of borrowing on succeeding residents.61 Similarly, voters may expect
that if future debt payments become too onerous their government might simply repudiate or
default on its debts.62 Repudiation would damage the jurisdiction’s credit rating, raising the
costs of subsequent borrowing, but these costs again would be relatively far into the future.63
In additional to the inter-temporal externality, state borrowing also involves some interjurisdictional externalities. Default by one state can increase credit costs for other similar or
neighboring states.64 Accordingly, each individual state may take on more debt, and
correspondingly more default risk, than would an optimizing social planner. Similarly, states are
probably “too big to fail.”65 The prospect of a state outright defaulting on its debts would be
relatively disastrous for residents, neighbors, creditors, and even other counter-parties of the
creditors.66 Thus, most analysts assume that central governments implicitly guarantee the debts
of their local government.67 This guarantee leads to moral hazard --- the costs of risky debt are
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shifted from the state to the central government, with the result that the state takes on more debt
than it would if it bore all the likely costs.68
Many commentators also believe that, in addition to these rational reasons for citizens to
agree to too much debt, there are also irrational factors that contribute to excess public
indebtedness.69 Econometric studies so far can neither confirm nor refute the hypothesis that
borrowing increases the size of government.70 A number of studies have shown, though, that
personal borrowing patterns are consistent with a story in which individuals incur greater
borrowing costs in the present than they would prefer later.71 Since your authors disagree on the
policy implications of putatively irrational behavior,72 we will proceed here on the assumption
that voters are rational.
Whatever the ultimate behavior of individual voters, there are also reasons to think that
public officials might have their own incentives to increase debt above the optimal level. All
officials have a limited time horizon in office. If the official wants to win reelection to extend
that time, or ring up “rents” from interest groups while she holds power, then the value to her of
enacting programs now will be much greater than the cost of paying for those programs after she
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is out of office.73 Besley and Case, for example, find that officials in their last term of a termlimited office enact fiscal policies that are farther from their constituent preferences than at other
times --- suggesting that when officials know they will not serve much longer, they are less
attentive to the future costs of their decisions.74
While federal officials also face these kinds of pressures, the dynamic is especially acute
at the state and local level. In a world where there is less than full Ricardian equivalence, each
jurisdiction faces competitive pressure to deliver services now at a better price than its
competitors. In another Besley and Case study, for instance, the authors find that voters appear
to evaluate their officials’ performance in part by comparing their own tax burden to those of
similar neighbors.75 One way for local officials to compete successfully is to shift the tax cost of
providing current services into the future. If Ricardian equivalence does not hold, voters might
deem the official who uses debt to finance government to be outperforming the neighboring
officials who raise taxes.76
It is also possible this strategy would be sensible even in a world with perfect Ricardian
equivalence, an outcome we call the “race to leverage”. The idea is that, by borrowing heavily in
period one, a jurisdiction is able to spend money on amenities to attract mobile business and
wealthy migrants. By period two, this influx of capital has caused the economy to grow,
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allowing the tax base to expand enough to more than compensate for the added debt burden
incurred in period one. By hypothesis, migrants are able to anticipate this growth, and so in
period one they are willing to enter and take on the future debt burden, because they know that
on net they will actually be getting more for less.77
3. Legal Limits on Local Debt
Given the political dynamics we have just described, it is unsurprising that many states
have sharply limited their own capacity to take on indebtedness, some with important
consequences for state stabilization capability. Nearly all states have a constitutional or statutory
requirement for an annual “balanced budget,” although the meaning of that requirement varies
widely.78 Other jurisdictions require super-majority legislative approval of new debt, impose
caps on the total amount of new or total borrowing, or require voter approval of some kinds of
debt issues.79 Few if any of these limits contain any facial exception for borrowing in times of
great need.80 Thus, whatever one’s view of the normative desirability of borrowing, it is evident
that the threat of excessive indebtedness has given rise to a legal system in which states are
apparently constrained in their ability to borrow at any time, including times when it is urgently
needed.81
As a practical matter, however, few of these limits are as constrictive as they appear.
State courts routinely allow their governments to sidestep fiscal limits.82 For instance, courts
have blessed arrangements where a state creates a separate “authority,” nominally independent
from the state, which then is able to borrow without limit and use the revenues for state
77
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purposes.83 Similarly, bonds secured by a stream of revenue from a particular project, such as a
new toll road, are usually not counted against state borrowing caps.84
Nonetheless, empirical evidence suggests that the limits are far from meaningless. In
particular, several studies show that states with tighter borrowing limits are less effective at
stabilizing their economies.85 Further, other evidence shows that the end-around mechanisms
states use are, though effective, also expensive, raising the state’s cost of borrowing.86
Overall, then, borrowing appears to be at best a highly imperfect solution to state fiscal
crises. Exit pressures limit state capacity to borrow, and the threat of voter indifference and
political opportunism has lead to legal mechanisms that choke off borrowing further. While we
might hope that judicial interpretations of legal restraints would be less constraining in tough
economic times, it is not clear that judges will be skilled at recognizing those times, or
articulating principled legal rules for distinguishing “good” borrowing from bad.
C. Rainy Day Funds
Savings serve as a possible crisis-funding alternative to tax increases and borrowing.87
States can save simply by carrying a budget surplus from one year to another, or alternatively by
dedicating money out of current revenues to a fund for use only in future fiscal emergencies,
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sometimes known as “rainy day funds.”88 Saving is fiscally equivalent to borrowing, but with
the temporal arrow reversed.89 In borrowing, the state transfers money from itself during a later
good time to a current bad time; savings moves money from the present good time to the time of
some future crisis.
Despite their similarities to borrowing, rainy day funds escape many of the problems that
plague local debt. Rainy day funds should, if anything, attract migrants and investment, rather
than driving them out, because they imply that future tax burdens will be lower than other
equivalent jurisdictions with no savings. Similarly, a large fund ought to increase home values.
Although we have not seen any scholarly analysis of the signaling effect of rainy day funds, in
theory they should function as precisely the opposite of exit: they send a signal of fiscal health to
inside and outside monitors of the jurisdiction’s officials. Thus, they can serve elected officials
in much the way payment of dividends serves firm managers, as a costly (and therefore credible)
signal of good individual performance.90
Thus, it is unsurprising that other commentators overwhelmingly endorse rainy day funds
as the best solution to state fiscal crises.91 Empirical evidence supports this consensus, with
several studies finding that state obligations to contribute money to dedicated funds protect states
against later fiscal shocks.92 Simple budget surpluses and rainy day funds with no obligation to
contribute are considerably less effective.93
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Unfortunately, many of the dynamics that threaten to cause runaway borrowing also tend
to undermine the usefulness of rainy day funds. Data show that few states save nearly enough
money to protect themselves against later downturns.94 The reasons are much the same as those
we have already sketched. All of the relevant actors, from individual voters to elected officials,
have strong incentives to prefer current over deferred spending. Any coalition that is currently in
power in a politically competitive state will be reluctant to transfer resources from itself to a
subsequent, and potentially competing, coalition.95 And economic stability is a public good, so
that we can predict that there rarely will be a coherent political constituency in favor of stability
for its own sake.96
Although we have predicted that establishing rainy day funds could be a positive signal
for public officials, that tactic is probably dominated by tax cuts. Just as with establishing a
fund, enacting a tax cut is a costly signal of success for the official. She gives up resources that
were under her own control, with the possible implication being that her management has been
so efficient that additional funds are unneeded. Alternately, the act of giving up control over the
funds could imply that the official is not self-serving but instead is looking out for the interests of
constituents. Unlike a rainy day fund, however, the tax cut returns money to the immediate use
of the voter. A rainy day fund is indistinguishable from a tax cut under perfect Ricardian
equivalence, but as we have discussed that is rarely observed in practice. Thus, the political
rewards to the politician will almost always be greater for enacting a tax cut than for establishing
a rainy day fund.
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Accordingly, there are no effective mechanisms that would allow states to provide
efficient levels of social insurance. Taxes and borrowing are constrained by exit and
normatively undesirable in any event. And absent some set of outside incentives, rainy day
funds will likely be rarity at the state level.
IV. Federal Interventions
So far we have shown that income smoothing is an important function of government, but
that state governments cannot likely provide it efficiently. That suggests an important role for
the federal government in social insurance. However, as we argue in this Part, many problems
also bedevil any federal efforts at income smoothing. Direct federal provision of social
insurance is contrary to many of the tenets of federalism, and would create moral hazard on the
part of state policy makers. And matching grants or other fiscal transfers to states run the risk of
being either too generous, and so distorting state decisions, or too slow and bureaucratic to
respond to a rapidly-changing economy.
A. Federalize Social Insurance
If states cannot effectively smooth incomes, the federal government might.97 There is
already an extensive and generally inconclusive literature on the role of the federal government
in redistributing wealth.98 While centralized redistribution mitigates some problems, it also may
sacrifice other federalism values.99 For example, one set of federal policy makers cannot easily
capture all social preferences for redistribution; redistribution at the local level allows individuals
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to sort themselves according to their preferences.100 Recasting this familiar debate in the context
of social insurance leads us to two additional arguments.
First, an underappreciated problem with federal provision of social insurance is that it
induces moral hazard at the state policy-making level.101 Where insurance is provided federally,
states would be able to externalize most of the downside risk of their regulation.102 Anytime a
decision seriously impacted the state’s economy, the state would receive money from the
common pool of federal funds. Since the state receives all of the benefit but pays little of the
cost of establishing the common pool, it actually has incentives to draw down the pool before
others can do the same, leading it to take ever riskier policies.103 The interconnectedness of state
economies would make this increased recklessness a particular hazard for the national
economy.104
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Some macroeconomists also argue that Ricardian equivalence would undercut federal
stabilization efforts.105 Again, Ricardian equivalence describes the situation where taxpayers
treat the discounted present value of debt service payments as indistinguishable from a current
tax. Under full equivalence, federal stimulus financed by debt might be largely ineffective,
because taxpayers respond by reducing their spending to account for the need to pay off the
debt.106 This lower consumer demand offsets the expansionary effects of the increased
government demand.107
On balance federalizing social insurance is therefore unappealing. The tradeoffs between
centralized and decentralized redistribution are theoretically uncertain. But social insurance has
some additional, clear-cut problems when offered at the national level.
B. Subsidies and Tax Exporting
Although there are hybrid regimes short of full federalization that solve some of the
problems we have just surveyed, these regimes also create new problems. In the first, wellknown, hybrid, the federal government would provide only partial financing for state budgets, as
through a matching grant program.108 A second hybrid not previously recognized in the
literature for its stabilization potential is tax exporting.
At first glance matching or other partial federal-financing programs seem promising.
Under a matching system, states bear some of the costs of risky policy, reducing moral hazard.109
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Co-financing may also reduce Ricardian equivalence. In a downturn with regional variation,
federal borrowing on behalf of affected states in effect allows the harder-hit regions to shift some
of the cost of repayment to others.110 Thus, taxpayers in these worst-off areas experience higher
government demand without an accompanying drop in consumer demand.111 Matching grants
also offer the possibility of traditional federalism benefits, such as superior information on the
part of local officials.112
States may also have a self-help route to the same result. In this second hybrid, hard-hit
states simply export their tax burden to other states.113 For example, a state that primarily
imports its retail goods might raise its sales tax. Assuming at least a portion of the tax is borne
by the shareholders and employees of integrated retail firms with outside owners, the sales tax
will allow the state to raise revenue without reducing the buying power of its citizens to the
extent an income tax might.114 More straightforwardly, a state like Delaware can hike its tolls.
As a result, exporting allows a state to diversify its revenues against negative shocks to its own
economy. The tax-exporting phenomenon is very familiar in the literature, but we believe we are
the first to observe that it represents a partial solution to the Ricardian equivalence problem.
We are not patting ourselves on the backs too heartily, though, because tax exporting is
probably a poor stabilization tool. The stabilization effects of tax exporting will be fairly
haphazard, with costs flowing randomly to states with economic ties to the exporter.115 And

110

Bayoumi & Masson, supra note 53, at 1027.
Id. at 1030.
112
See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
267, 313 (1998).
113
Robert Tannenwald, Fiscal Disparity Among the States Revisited, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., Jul-Aug. 1999, at 3, 4.
114
Stephen H. Pollock, Mechanisms for Exporting the State Sales Tax Burden in the Absence of Federal
Deductibility, 44 NAT’L TAX J. 297, 299 (1991). For consideration whether the economic incidence of taxes can
actually be shifted across borders, see Charles E. McClure, Jr., Tax Exporting and the Commerce Clause, in FISCAL
FEDERALISM AND THE TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES 169, 171--83 (Charles E. McClure, Jr. & Peter
Mieszkowski eds., 1983).
115
Cf. Levinson, supra note 35, at 724 (describing unintentional cross-border effects of fiscal stimulus efforts).
111

24

exporting states have no incentive to protect their trading partners from the negative effects of
the exported tax.116 Thus, it is likely that in some instances exporting may result in transfers in
the wrong direction --- moving money from the hardest-hit states to one that is not suffering as
badly from a downturn.
Ultimately, however, neither approach is likely to be successful because both strategies
threaten to distort state policy. It is a familiar point that both federal subsidies and tax exporting
give rise to fiscal externalities.117 Since the taxing jurisdiction does not bear the full cost of its
policies, it does not take into account the full extent of its costs to others, including potential
cyclical effects.118 For instance, a state may be relatively indifferent to the possibility that the
cost of bailing it out of a regional crisis could increase the federal government’s own costs of
borrowing, or even the chances of a national downturn, as its citizens would bear only a small
fraction of the costs of either outcome.119 More generally, economists argue that federal supports
raise state expenditures above the level their citizens would have chosen in an undistorted
political market, 120 although one of us has argued in turn that theory is ambiguous about whether
this upward distortion will be outweighed by downward pressure from tax competition.121
Subsidies also are wasteful if they cannot be turned off. Matching grants reduce federal
funds available for other projects. State officials have little incentive to turn down matching
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funds in order to make them available for a more efficient project elsewhere.122 Additionally,
since matching grants by definition require state expenditures, fiscally strapped states may
actually draw less funds.123 As a result of these factors, partial financing can actually transfer
money from states where the economy is struggling to those where it is succeeding.
Finally, outside subsidies may have undesirable stabilization effects when states’
economies are expanding.124 Stabilization policy aims not only to soften the impact of
recessions but also to maintain growth at sustainable levels without excess inflation.125 Thus,
subsidies for state spending might lead to some inflationary pressure in boom times.
Making federal fiscal supports temporary or discretionary solves some of these problems,
but, maddeningly, creates yet others. Macroeconomists argue that the delays and political costs
that attend enacting discretionary programs greatly reduce the effectiveness of any resulting
expenditure.126 Perhaps the most important aspect of counter-cyclical spending is its timing, and
discretionary programs mean that the timing of funds will depend on politics, not economic
necessity.127 Thus, experts claim that “automatic” stabilizers are much preferable to grant
programs.128 For example, Christina Romer found historical evidence that automatic stabilizers
were considerably more effective than discretionary policies.129 Consider the 2009 $787 billion
stimulus package. The stimulus required time and vast political capital to enact, with the result
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that it was enacted together with many different flavors of pork.130 We enjoy barbecue as much -- nay, more --- than the next professor, but automatic stabilizers are faster and more efficient.
It might be argued that social insurance subsidy criteria could be written ex ante to kick
in only in subsequent crises, eliminating the need for later legislative action. But to avoid the
problems of continuing subsidies, the legislature would have to write binding criteria to
distinguish stimulus from other spending, presumably to be administered by court, agency, or
both. Thus, grant funds will not flow in a recession until the administrator signs off, greatly
slowing the expenditure of funds and offering opportunities for political rents for the
administrator.131 Alternately, if the criteria are easy to meet, then the moral hazard problem
returns.
What is needed, then, is federal fiscal support for states that turns off automatically in
good times, but stays on in downturns when the need for stimulus may outweigh the costs of
policy distortions. Is it possible to design a state fiscal support that only operates when states
need the money, keeping in mind that complex formulae that must be ruled on bureaucrats are
emphatically not automatic? It is indeed, as we shall now explain.
V. The Alternative Minimum Tax as Automatic Stabilizer
In the last two Parts we showed that in the absence of outside support state budgets are
likely to reinforce downturns in the business cycle. However, we also argued that continued
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federal subsidies risked distorting state political decisions, as well as exaggerating the growth
side of the cycle. Ideally, then, we would have a subsidy design in which funds are curtailed
automatically when recessions end. Given the political economy and other practical problems
limiting the ability of state and local politicians to commit to countercyclical taxation and
spending policies, an automatic stabilizer that is largely outside of the control of state and local
politicians or their constituents would be very attractive. These mechanisms would generate
counter-cyclical effects without any proactive decisions being made on the part of political
actors.132
Surprisingly, the federal Alternative Minimum Tax (“AMT”) already performs this
function, although it has not yet been perfectly attuned for use as an automatic stabilizer. In one
respect it should not be totally surprising that the AMT is a major stabilization player.
Economists have recognized that the federal income tax is a form of automatic stabilizer at the
national level, because its progressive structure results in tax rate reductions as income
declines.133 In his important recent draft, Yair Listokin predicts that many so-called “tax
expenditures” reduce the efficacy of this stabilization effect.134 Tax expenditures allow the
taxpayer to reduce her income when she engages in certain expenditures, such as purchasing a
home. Because the net value of these expenditures falls when the taxpayer’s income and
marginal rate decline, tax expenditures have the procyclical effect of reducing demand when
incomes fall, and vice-versa. Finally, Listokin notes that “phaseouts,” such as the AMT, may
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mitigate this procyclical effect by turning off the tax expenditure’s incentive power when income
rises above a certain level.135
This analysis can be extended to encompass the effects of federal tax provisions on state
budgets. We will argue in this Part that federal tax rules have substantial positive impact not
only on state economies but also on each state’s ability to raise revenue. As we will explain, the
AMT acts to “turn off” the effect of these tax rules as taxpayer income rises. In effect, then,
federal tax law provides states with a subsidy, but the AMT causes that subsidy to diminish when
state economies are performing well. We will first explain the basic tax rules that provide for
this result, and then offer empirical evidence that our theory is correct.
A. Tax Mechanics of the AMT
First, what is the AMT? It is “alternative” only in the sense that sinking is the alternative
to floating; taxpayers are dragged into its reaches, rather than opting in. In essence, the AMT is
a parallel tax code. Taxpayers must compute their liability under both the AMT and the rest of
the Tax Code and pay whichever sum is higher.136 In general, the AMT has a broader base but
slightly less progressive rates.137 By broader base we mean that many items that reduce tax
under the standard income tax do not affect AMT liability --- the AMT disallows a number of the
standard tax system’s deductions and credits.
1. General Features of AMT
While marginal rates vary under the standard system from ten to thirty-five percent, the
AMT has two rates, twenty-six and twenty-eight percent.138 Both systems also phase out certain
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exclusions so that at very high incomes effective rates may be higher.139 Under the standard
income tax, individual taxpayers pay no tax until they earn about $10,000, because of the
combination of the personal exemption and standard deduction.140 Under the AMT, there is no
standard deduction, but the personal exemption is very large, so that an individual paid no tax (in
2009) until she earned about $46,700.141 This exclusion amount is not indexed for inflation,
which is why more and more people have become subject to AMT liability over the years.142
The exclusion amount for married couples filing jointly is less than double the individual
exclusion, so families are more likely to pay AMT.143
Typically, taxpayers become subject to AMT because their taxable income under the
standard income tax was reduced by deductions that are not available under the AMT.144 For
instance, suppose a single taxpayer Galle with gross income $100,000. Galle first computes his
liability under the standard income tax. If he does not “itemize,” and simply claims the standard
deduction, he reduces his income by $8,950 for the personal exemption and standard deduction,
leaving $91,050. Different portions of this money are taxed at different rates, because of the Tax
Code’s progressive rate structure. Ultimately, Galle will owe about $19,479 in tax, an average
rate of roughly 21%. He now checks his AMT liability. Under the AMT, he would have taxable
income of only $53,300 after the personal exemption. Twenty-six percent of $53,300 is only
$13,858. This is, of course, smaller than his standard income tax liability, so he owes no AMT.
Consider now Klick, who instead of taking the standard deduction and personal
exemption, claims exemption for numerous children and itemizes his deductions, reducing his
139
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$100,000 gross income to $51,000 taxable income.145 Klick’s tax liability under the standard
system is about $9,088. The AMT does not permit exemption for additional dependents;
suppose Klick’s itemized deductions, too, are not permitted under the AMT. In that case, his
AMT liability is $13,858. Since that is the higher amount, he pays it. Thus, we would say that
Klick is “subject” to the AMT; the AMT increases his tax by about $4,000.
Because of the large exclusion amount, the likelihood of being subject to AMT liability
likely increases with income, at least at low and moderate income levels.146 That is, no matter
how many child exemptions he claimed, if Klick’s gross income were less than $46,700, AMT
could not have affected him, because AMT liability for everyone earning less than $46,700 is
zero. And AMT liability for those earning $46,701 is only twenty-six cents. So the likelihood of
becoming “subject” to the AMT is the result of a combination of increasing income and
increasing use of deductions and exemptions prohibited by AMT. This connection between
AMT and income turns out to be crucial to our argument, as we develop more fully in Part
V.A.2.
Another implication of this structure is that the AMT makes useless a number of
deductions and exclusions available under the Code. Suppose that one of Klick’s itemized
deductions were accelerated depreciation on business equipment, which he purchased precisely
because he believed it would reduce his taxable income. However, because of AMT, Klick paid
more in tax than he expected. In our example, AMT liability was only higher by $4,000, so
Klick lost about $4,000 worth of the value of his depreciation deduction. In other cases AMT
may be much higher than standard income tax liability, so that effectively the taxpayer receives
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none of the economic benefit of her deductions. We refer to that scenario as one in which the
AMT “turns off” the deductions whose benefits were lost.
Not all the deductions available under the standard income tax are unavailable under the
AMT. Many important adjustments, such as the costs of operating a for-profit business, interest
expenses related to a purchase-money mortgage on a primary residence, and the exclusion for
insurance premiums paid by an employer all reduce both AMT income as well as standard
taxable income.147 Several other major adjustments to income are unavailable under the AMT,
as we now elaborate.
2. State and Local Taxes
For many years by far the most important item disallowed by the AMT was the deduction
for taxes paid to state and local governments (“SALT”), section 164 of the Tax Code.148 The
SALT deduction has become somewhat less dominant as incomes have crept up above the
AMT’s personal exemption amount, owing to the fact that large state tax bills are usually the
product of large incomes.149 Still, disallowance of the SALT deduction continues to account for
just under half of all the AMT’s revenues.150
The AMT’s effects on the SALT deduction account for much of the AMT’s power as an
automatic state-revenue stabilizer. The SALT deduction acts like a federal matching grant for
certain state tax revenues.151 For every dollar a taxpayer pays her state and local governments in
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income and property taxes, she reduces her federal tax bill by one dollar times her marginal
federal rate.152 So, for a taxpayer in the top federal bracket, each dollar of state income tax
reduces federal tax by $0.35. Taxpayers in states without an income tax may also elect to deduct
their total annual sales and use taxes paid.153
Thus, the SALT deduction functions as a subsidy for state and local governments.154
First, it induces a substitution effect in favor of state and local taxation.155 A local taxpayer
facing the choice between savings, private consumption, and consumption of government
services (i.e., higher taxes) should prefer government services because a dollar’s worth of
government services costs her only $.65, while a dollar’s worth of savings or private
consumption costs $1. The deduction also likely increases demand for local government through
an income effect. Assuming local government services are a so-called “normal” good, in which
demand rises as income rises, the taxpayer’s higher after-federal-tax wealth should produce a
greater demand for local government services. And, consistent with these theories, empirical
studies have documented that deductibility has an upward influence on deductible state and local
tax levels, although there is some question whether overall rates increase, or instead if taxes are
simply shifted from deductible to non-deductible forms.156

152

Kirk J. Stark, Fiscal Federalism and Tax Progressivity: Should the Federal Income Tax Encourage State
Redistribution?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1389, 1414 (2004).
153
T.C. § 164(b)(5). A use tax is a mirror-image of the sales tax, but is imposed on the out-of-state purchase of
goods. Walter Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income and Consumption in the New Economy, 38 GA. L. REV. 1, 19-21 (2003). For an interesting analysis of the complex interaction between the sales tax election and other choices,
see Herwig Schlunk, Why Every State Should Have an Income Tax (and Retail Sales Tax, Too), 78 MISS. L.J. 637,
677--81 (2009).
154
In making this claim, we do not intend also to take a position on whether the SALT deduction can be justified as
a matter of the normative definition of the ideal tax base. For further discussion of that issue, see Brian Galle,
Federal Fairness to State Taxpayers: Irrationality, Unfunded Mandates, and the “SALT” Deduction, 106 MICH. L.
REV. 805 (2008).
155
Lawrence B. Lindsey, Federal Deductibility of State and Local Taxes: A Test of Public Choice by Representative
Government, in FISCAL FEDERALISM: QUANTITATIVE STUDIES 137, 169 (Harvey Rosen ed., 1988).
156
Studies finding higher revenues from deductible categories include Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Harvey Rosen,
Federal Deductibility and Local Property Tax Rates, 27 J. URB. ECON. 269, 271 (1990), Edward Gramlich, The
Deductibility of State and Local Taxes, 38 NAT’L TAX J. 447 (1985), and those surveyed in Bruce Bartlett, The Case

33

The AMT modifies the SALT subsidy by reducing the size of the grant for economically
thriving jurisdictions. As incomes in a state rise, more and more of the state’s taxpayers will
exceed the AMT’s personal exemption threshold, so that the AMT will “turn off” some or all of
their SALT deduction. Conversely, as incomes fall, the AMT’s effects will diminish, turning the
SALT subsidy back on. We examine empirically whether the AMT in fact is related to income
in Part V.B.
This variable, countercyclical subsidy has at least two distinct stabilization effects for
states. First, it mitigates most of the constraints states normally face in maintaining or increasing
tax rates during downturns. Recall that descriptively, states cannot raise rates because of tax
competition with other states. The deduction, when it is effective, mitigates this exit pressure (or
the credible threat of it) by diminishing the after-tax cost of any given state’s own states. On the
normative side, states should attempt to smooth rates over time.157 The AMT/SALT
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combination allows states to achieve similar effective net-of-federal-tax rates during crises and
other times, as we illustrate here with figure one.158

Gross Income
State Income Tax Rate
State Income Tax Amount
Reduction in Federal Tax
(assume marginal rate 33%)
State Tax Net of Fed. Tax
Effective State Income Tax
Rate

Section 164 “Off”
$900
11%
$100
$0

Section 164 “On”
$900
16.5%
$150
$ 50

$100
11%

$100
11%

Although the state raises tax rates during a downturn, the AMT turns on section 164, resulting in no net
change in effective state income tax rates.
Fig. 1

The second effect of the AMT/SALT combination is to allow a careful state to increase
taxes without reducing consumers’ marginal propensity to spend on other consumer goods.
Again, countercyclical federal subsidies act as inter-jurisdictional transfers, increasing the wealth
of a region affected by a downturn. If the state absorbs no more than this transfer amount in
increased taxes, consumer spending will be unaffected. This can be illustrated by Figure two.
Alternately, even if the state does not increase its tax revenues or its spending, there will be some
stimulative effect from the SALT deduction, because the state’s citizens will be the beneficiaries
of transfers from less-affected parts of the country, raising their wealth available for
consumption.

Section 164 “Off”
158

Section 164 “On”

The figure simplifies reality somewhat. In actuality, only some taxpayers will benefit from section 164 even in
severe downturns, so that effective rates for those earners will increase if the jurisdiction raises rates across the
board. Normatively, then, the jurisdiction in crisis should aim to limit tax rate increases for those who remain
subject to the AMT, unless those earners exhibit little elasticity in their response to a higher rate. As a practical
matter, however, it will likely be difficult to change rates selectively only for those spared the AMT, which is one
reason we write that the AMT/SALT pairing only mitigates state tax constraints.
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Gross Income
State Tax Amount
Federal Tax Amount
(assume marginal rate 33%)
Total Tax Paid
Net After-Tax Income

$900
$100
$300

$900
$150
$250 ($300 - ($150*.33))

$400
$500

$400
$500

Although the state increases its tax revenues during downturn, the AMT turns on section 164, resulting in
no net change in the average taxpayer’s after-tax income available for consumption.
Fig. 2

Formally, in the case where state and local tax costs are deductible from the federal
income tax, a representative voter’s demand curve for the social insurance program (i) is given

(

)

by Qi = f ti (1 − α t f ) , I , px where ti represents the per capita tax cost of each unit of the
program, t f represents the average federal tax rate faced by the individual and α represents the
fraction of state and local tax expenditures that is deductible on the federal tax return, I is the
individual’s income, and px is the price of a composite private consumption good. In this case,
the federal government absorbs some of the individual’s tax cost for the social insurance
program. By the law of demand, because α lies in the unit interval, as the fraction of
deductibility increases, the individual demands more of the social insurance program.
To see how the AMT works as an automatic stabilizer in this framework, note that
because social insurance programs are normal goods, when the individual’s income I increases,
so does his demand for the program. However, given that the application of the AMT is
positively related to income, α will decline with income until it reaches zero in the limit. These
two effects of changing income will have opposite effects on the quantity of the social insurance
program demanded. Thus, in times of economic growth, while the person’s income effect will
induce him to demand more of the program, the price effect will induce him to demand less, as
the AMT phases out the federal subsidy. In times of recession, as incomes drop, the income

36

effect will induce a lower demand, while the price effect will induce a higher demand because
the AMT phaseout revives the federal subsidy. Thus, as a theoretical matter the AMT is
countercyclical, dampening demand swings caused by changes in income.
In sum, the AMT modifies the SALT deduction so that it better matches the ideal federal
fiscal subsidy. The AMT concentrates federal subsidies in states where income is falling,
diminishing any distortive or inflationary effects of the subsidy at other times. We will examine
empirical evidence for this proposition in Parts V.B. and VI.
3. Other provisions
In addition to the SALT deduction, the AMT also turns off a number of other adjustments
available under the standard income tax. Few of these other provisions have any empirical
significance.159 We therefore focus here on the two we view as most important of this motley
remainder. The first, the exemption for additional dependents, is a large component of the AMT
but has little direct effect on state finances.160 The second, the deductibility of home equity
interest, involves a small number of AMT taxpayers but has a more direct connection to states’
fiscal health.161
Just under half of all taxpayers who pay AMT do so because it disallows their dependent
exemptions.162 Under the standard income tax, parents of dependent children and caretakers for
adults with disabilities can reduce their taxable income by roughly $3,500 per dependent.163 This
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Tax Policy Center, Urban Institute & Brookings Institution, AMT Preference Items 2002, 2004-2006,
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=468. For a complete listing and explanation of
each provision, see JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 2--4.
160
See JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 18 Tbl.3.
161
Id.
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Id.
163
T.C. § 151(d)(1), (4) (setting amount at $2,000 in 1989 dollars, adjusted for inflation).
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adjustment is not available under the AMT, with the result that families with many children and
income above the AMT personal exemption amount are likely to face AMT liability.164
The dependent exemption’s impact on state business cycles is fairly muted. As with the
SALT deduction, the AMT will tend to channel more federal money to a region through the
exemption when average earnings fall. This increased wealth will strengthen consumption and,
if government services are normal goods, there would be an income effect, somewhat increasing
support for local taxing and spending.
What is less clear is why a policy planner would choose to target those funds specifically
to large families. Perhaps families with many dependents have a higher marginal propensity to
consume. That is, they will save less of the stimulus, increasing its effectiveness. But one could
imagine arguments to the contrary (college savings…) and we are unaware of evidence one way
or the other.
Deductions for home equity loans are a less common source of AMT liability, but
translate more directly into stabilization policy. The standard income tax allows borrowers to
deduct the costs of interest on up to $100,000 worth of loans secured by, but not used to
purchase, a residence --- in other words, on home equity loans.165 The AMT retains a deduction
for “purchase money” debt, but turns off the home equity loans deduction.166 Fewer than 1.6%
of AMT taxpayers lost a home equity deduction.167
Subsidies for home equity loans are stimulative in two ways. First, the home equity loan
is essentially negative savings --- it changes accumulated net worth (positive equity) into cash,
164

Leonard E. Burman, The Alternative Minimum Tax: Assault on the Middle Class, MILKEN INSTITUTE REVIEW,
Fourth Q. 2007, at 12, 14, available at <http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1001113_Burman_AMT.pdf>.
165
T.C. § 163(h)(3)(C).
166
T.C. § 56(b)(1)(C).
167
However, the total dollar value of the lost deduction in 2007 was more than $13 billion. Leonard Burman et al.,
How Big Are Total Individual Income Tax Expenditures, and Who Benefits from Them?, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 79, 81
Tbl.1 (2008).
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which presumably is to be used for immediate consumption. This is a classic countercyclical
effect: When falling incomes turn on the home equity deduction, homeowners become more
inclined to spend, and vice-versa.168 Although diminished wealth might reduce an owner’s
marginal propensity to consume, the home-equity subsidy creates a substitution effect, making
consumption cheaper relative to other choices.
States may also benefit from the home-equity deduction through higher property taxes.
Tax benefits that may be claimed only by homeowners increase the value of owning over
renting. Thus, the tax benefit should “capitalize,” or be reflected in the sale price of homes.169 If
(as is generally true) property taxes are based on appraised value, this increase in value will also
increase property tax revenues.170 The AMT likely reduces the degree of capitalization by
making it uncertain whether a buyer will be able to obtain the tax benefits of a home equity loan.
At a guess, we would predict that this uncertainty would be higher during times when many
taxpayers are subject to AMT, making the deduction somewhat countercyclical. But we freely
concede that is pure speculation.
***
So far, we have set out a general theory of the countercyclical effects of the AMT. In the
next subpart, we will attempt to quantify more precisely the significance of these effects.
B. AMT Liability is Increasing in Income at the Jurisdictional Level
Our argument here depends on the assumption that AMT liability in a jurisdiction rises
together with income. This is an intuitive point at low income levels. However, the standard tax
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See Listokin, supra note 4, at 16.
See Wallace E. Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Values: An
Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J. POL. ECON. 957, 966--67 (1969).
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Julie Roin, The Consequences of Undoing the Federal Income Tax, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 319, 331 (2003).
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system imposes a 35% maximum rate, while the AMT tops out at 28%.171 Thus, it is
theoretically ambiguous whether jurisdictions with higher average incomes experience greater
AMT liability.172 Accordingly, we present here empirical evidence that AMT liability is
increasing in income at the jurisdictional level.
Using IRS SOI data from 2004-2007173, we plot the relationship between state per capita
GDP and the fraction of income tax filers who paid a positive AMT on their federal return in
Figure 3. The data include observations for all 50 states. In addition to the scatterplot, we
provide a linear best fit line through the data as well as its 95 percent confidence interval.

Figure 3:
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Figure 3 shows a statistically significant positive relationship between AMT incidence and state
per capita income. Further, this relationship endures at each point of the income distribution.
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Figure 4 provides the same graph using data only for the returns of those individuals making
more than $50,000 in a year.

Figure 4:
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Figure 5 further restricts attention to returns of individuals making more than $75,000.
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Figure 5:
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Figure 6 examines returns of individuals earning more than $100,000.

Figure 6:
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Lastly, Figure 7 provides the graph for those with incomes greater than $200,000 (the last
income group for which the IRS provides AMT breakdowns).

Figure 7:
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Within each income category, the fraction of returns with a positive AMT amount is increasing
in per capita state GDP, providing strong support for the assumption that the AMT is likely to
affect a larger fraction of state residents during economic boom times in the state than during
economic downturns.
VI. Empirical Evidence Of Stabilization Effect
If the AMT works as an automatic fiscal stabilizer, we should find that public spending
on social insurance programs at the state level decreases as the fraction of state taxpayers falling
under the AMT increases, conditional on state income. As implied above, state spending in these
areas is a normal good, thus we should find that as income goes up, spending goes up as well.
Further, as a greater fraction of individuals is covered by the AMT, the price of that public
spending increases for them. This price increase, all other things equal, should lead these
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individuals to reduce their support for the spending. If state politicians are sensitive to voter
interests, this should lead to a decline in spending.
A. State Spending
To examine these predictions empirically, we collected data on state per capita spending
in four common social insurance categories: welfare spending, education spending, spending on
hospitals, and spending on other public health programs.174 Because our AMT coverage data is
only available beginning in 2004, our sample covers the period 2004-2007. Because four years
of data provides a relatively small sample, we expect that our estimates will be relatively
imprecise, limiting our ability to make strong inferences. That is, the large standard errors likely
to be associated with our estimated coefficients suggest we will have low power, making it
harder for us to reject the hypothesis that there is no relationship between AMT coverage and
state spending.175
To account for any effects of inflation on state spending, we use the consumer price index
to deflate all expenditure and income amounts to a constant price level.176 Because our outcome
variables are per capita spending, to provide estimates that are representative of average effects
across the nation, we perform weighted least squares using state population as the weight in each
regression.177
We provide descriptive statistics (again, weighted by population) in Table 1.

Table 1
174

These data come from the U.S. Census Bureau, Governments Division, Survey of State Government Finances,
available at http://www.census.gov/govs/www/state.html . We view education as social insurance because, among
other reasons, retraining (for adults) and investing in a child’s future income are both household responses to the
loss of employment for one of its current earners.
175
For a discussion of the relationship between sample size and statistical power, see MICHAEL O. FINKELSTEIN AND
BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS182 (2d ed. 2001).
176
CPI data are available here: http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm . 1982-1984 prices provide the base year for price
comparisons.
177
See JOSHUA ANGRIST AND JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS 92 (2009).
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Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Description
Mean
St. Dev.
Spending
Real State Government
1,590
313
Spending Per Capita on
Education, Welfare,
Hospitals, and Public
Health
Education
Real State Government
798
146
Spending
Spending Per Capita on
Education
Welfare
Real State Government
629
185
Spending
Spending Per Capita on
Welfare
Hospital
Real State Government
75
43
Spending
Spending Per Capita on
Hospitals
Health Spending Real State Government
88
41
Spending Per Capita on
Public Health
AMT Share
% of Federal Returns
0.027
0.015
Paying AMT > 0
0.081
0.038
AMT Share 50k+ % of Federal Returns
Paying AMT > 0 for
Filers with Incomes >
$50,000
0.134
0.057
AMT Share 75k+ % of Federal Returns
Paying AMT > 0 for
Filers with Incomes >
$75,000
0.220
0.082
AMT Share
% of Federal Returns
100k+
Paying AMT > 0 for
Filers with Incomes >
$100,000
AMT Share
% of Federal Returns
0.601
0.160
200k+
Paying AMT > 0 for
Filers with Incomes >
$200,000
Income
Real State Per Capita
18,661
2,669
GDP
Note: Sample covers 2004-2007; all variables weighted by state population.

Source
Census

Census

Census

Census

Census

IRS
IRS

IRS

IRS

IRS

BEA

Our empirical specification includes our AMT coverage variable and the state income
variable as discussed above. Also, to isolate the effect of AMT coverage, we include dummy
variables for each state. These so-called state fixed effects allow for heterogeneity across states
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in their baseline level of spending. For idiosyncratic reasons, such as cultural differences or
other path dependencies, some states may naturally spend more on social insurance programs
than others. The state fixed effects allow us to control for these differences which is important if
the differences are not random with respect to the AMT coverage variable. We also include
dummy variables for each year to allow for the possibility that spending may be systematically
higher (or lower) in a given year across all states. Reasons for this may include national macro
economic changes or policy changes at the federal level that induce a change in spending
everywhere.
As a technical matter, we allow for clustering of standard errors at the state level. Doing
so allows for dependence among observations within a state over time. Specifically, because
there is likely some inertia in state spending programs as well as in the fraction of individuals
who pay the AMT each year within a state, the observations from, for example, Pennsylvania in
2004 and 2005 are unlikely to be statistically independent. If there is positive dependence (e.g.,
if higher state spending in one year likely leads to relatively high state spending in the next),
failure to allow for clustering will understate the true standard errors of the relevant coefficients.
On the other hand, if there is negative dependence (e.g., if high spending in one year is offset by
lower spending in the next), the true standard errors of the relevant coefficients will be
overstated.178 Along the same lines, there may be dependence across observations within a given
year. Such dependence could be the result of changes in federal policy that affect spending in all
states in a way that is not completely accounted for by year fixed effects. Similarly, changes in
the tax code or macroeconomic changes may affect the coverage of the AMT across all states in

178

For a discussion of this problem, see Marianne Betrand et al., How Much Should We Trust Differences-inDifferences Estimates?, 119 Q. J. ECON. 249 (2004).
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a way not fully controlled for in the regression itself. To allow for these effects, we also provide
standard errors that account for multi-way clustering.179
Our first analysis looks at real (i.e., deflated) state per capita spending across education,
welfare, hospitals, and public health in the aggregate. We first examine total AMT coverage.
However, there is reason to believe that not everyone accurately predicts whether the AMT will
be binding on them.180 This implies that errors in expectations will affect whether an individual
supports spending or not. Our hypothesis is that higher income people will be better able to
predict that they will be affected by the AMT.181 To examine this, we provide five different
measures of AMT coverage: 1) the fraction of all federal returns paying a positive AMT amount;
2) the fraction of all federal returns paying a positive AMT amount for individuals with incomes
above $50,000; 3) the fraction of all federal returns paying a positive AMT amount for
individuals with incomes above $75,000; 4) the fraction of all federal returns paying a positive
AMT amount for individuals with incomes above $100,000; and 5) the fraction of all federal
returns paying a positive AMT amount for individuals with incomes above $200,000. Our
expectation is that we will observe greater precision of any AMT effect in the higher income
ranges. Regression results are provided in Table 2.

Table 2
AMT Coverage and Total State Spending Per Capita
(Standard Errors Clustered at the State Level in Parentheses)
[Standard Errors Multi-Way Clustered at the State and Year Level in Brackets]
AMT Share

-776
(4097)
[7162]

179

These problems and their solution are discussed in A. Colin Cameron, Jonah B. Gelbach, and Douglas L. Miller,
Robust Inference with Multi-way Clustering, J. BUS. ECON. STAT. (forthcoming).
180
See infra text accompanying notes 184--196.
181
Additionally, at very low income levels AMT payers pay little in state tax, see supra note 149, and therefore the
AMT is unlikely to affect their views of state tax levels.
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AMT Share
50k+

-1667
(1120)
[1568]

AMT Share
75k+

-1403
(629)**
[687]**

AMT Share
100k+

-1023
(387)**
[329]***

AMT Share
200k+

-805
(308)**
[246]***

0.016
0.012
0.019
0.030
0.023
(0.019)
(0.019)
(0.020)
(0.020)
(0.019)
[0.015]
[0.013]
[0.013]
[0.013]*
[0.013]
Note: Sample covers 2004-2007. All regressions are estimated with population weights. All
regressions include state and year fixed effects.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 (against a two sided test of the null hypothesis of no effect).
Income

As shown in Table 2, in every case we find a negative relationship between AMT
coverage and total per capita state spending. The effect is statistically significant once the AMT
share variable is calculated for filers with incomes of $75,000 or above, and, as expected, the
precision of the estimates improves as the AMT share is calculated for higher income filers. We
also find evidence that state spending on social insurance programs does appear to be a normal
good, with positive per capita GDP coefficients, but the effect is not statistically significant.
This is most likely due to the lack of precision that comes with our limited sample that only
covers four years.
In terms of the practical size of the effects we estimate, if the fraction of AMT coverage
among filers earning more than $50,000 increased by a standard deviation, our results imply that
total real per capita state spending would decline by about 4 percent. The comparable effect of

48

an increase in the fraction of AMT filers with incomes above $200,000 is an 8 percent decline in
per capita spending.182 The exact magnitude of these figures is less interesting, however, than
the fact that the practical size of the effect we have identified is non-trivial from a policy
perspective.
In Table 3, we examine the effect of AMT coverage on real state per capita spending on
education.

Table 3
AMT Coverage and State Education Spending Per Capita
(Standard Errors Clustered at the State Level in Parentheses)
[Standard Errors Multi-Way Clustered at the State and Year Level in Brackets]
AMT Share

AMT Share
50k+

-30
(1786)
[2320]
-310
(627)
[591]

AMT Share
75k+

-299
(383)
[308]

AMT Share
100k+

-229
(238)
[185]

AMT Share
200k+

-301
(227)
[184]

0.013
0.012
0.008
0.015
0.014
(0.009)
(0.008)
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.009)*
[0.008]
[0.009]
[0.008]
[0.008]**
[0.008]*
Note: Sample covers 2004-2007. All regressions are estimated with population weights. All
Income

182

It is interesting to note that while one might assume that some of this effect will be countered by the income
effect which implies that as more individuals fall under the AMT, incomes are rising leading to increased support for
public spending. While this is possible, because the income effect is based on real income, while the AMT is not
indexed for inflation, this counteracting income effect need not be present.

49

regressions include state and year fixed effects.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 (against a two sided test of the null hypothesis of no effect).
Although we continue to find a negative effect of AMT coverage on state per capita
education spending, our results are imprecise, and only the result associated with AMT filers
with incomes above $200,000 is even close to being statistically significant at the 10 percent
level. We also continue to find that education spending’s relationship with state per capita
income is positive.
In table 4, we look at welfare spending.

Table 4
AMT Coverage and State Welfare Spending Per Capita
(Standard Errors Clustered at the State Level in Parentheses)
[Standard Errors Multi-Way Clustered at the State and Year Level in Brackets]
AMT Share

AMT Share
50k+

739
(2760)
[4478]
-572
(786)
[1005]

AMT Share
75k+

-574
(461)
[478]

AMT Share
100k+

-448
(290)
[252]*

AMT Share
200k+

-112
(204)
[151]

Income

0.001
-0.003
-0.005
-0.007
-0.003
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.015)
[0.008]
[0.008]
[0.009]
[0.009]
[0.011]
Note: Sample covers 2004-2007. All regressions are estimated with population weights. All
regressions include state and year fixed effects.
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***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 (against a two sided test of the null hypothesis of no effect).
For per capita welfare spending, we find support for the negative effect of AMT coverage
on spending except when we look at AMT filers of all income levels, including those earning
less than $50,000. The precision of the results is quite low, leading us to find that the result is
statistically significant only when we focus on AMT filers making above $100,000 (at the 10
percent level).
Next we examine real state per capita spending on hospitals in Table 5.

Table 5
AMT Coverage and State Hospital Spending Per Capita
(Standard Errors Clustered at the State Level in Parentheses)
[Standard Errors Multi-Way Clustered at the State and Year Level in Brackets]
AMT Share

AMT Share
50k+

-860
(543)
[293]***
-352
(228)
[137]***

AMT Share
75k+

-218
(145)
[75]***

AMT Share
100k+

-134
(92)
[46]***

AMT Share
200k+

-115
(80)
[65]*

0.000
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.002
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.002)
[002]
[0.002]
[0.002]
[0.002]
[0.002]
Note: Sample covers 2004-2007. All regressions are estimated with population weights. All
regressions include state and year fixed effects.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 (against a two sided test of the null hypothesis of no effect).
Income
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For real per capita state spending on hospitals, we find strong support for our hypothesis.
The relationship between spending and AMT coverage is uniformly negative and is statistically
significant when multi-way dependence across within states and within years is accounted for.
Our results suggest that if the fraction of income tax filers with incomes above $50,000 that had
to pay the AMT were to increase by one standard deviation, real state per capita hospital
spending would decline by almost 18 percent. If a similar calculation is done for changes in
AMT coverage among those earning more than $200,000, the corresponding decline in hospital
spending is almost 25 percent. These results again suggest that this AMT subsidy effect is
substantial.
In Table 6, we cover real state per capita public health spending.

Table 6
AMT Coverage and State Public Health Spending Per Capita
(Standard Errors Clustered at the State Level in Parentheses)
[Standard Errors Multi-Way Clustered at the State and Year Level in Brackets]
AMT Share

AMT Share
50k+

-625
(1215)
[1149]
-432
(383)
[351]

AMT Share
75k+

-313
(187)*
[166]*

AMT Share
100k+

-212
(93)**
[87]**

AMT Share
200k+

-277
(120)**
[78]***
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Income

0.012
0.011
0.010
0.010
0.006
(0.010)
(0.010)
(0.010)
(0.009)
(0.006)
[0.007]*
[0.007]
[0.007]
[0.006]
[0.003]*
Note: Sample covers 2004-2007. All regressions are estimated with population weights. All
regressions include state and year fixed effects.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 (against a two sided test of the null hypothesis of no effect).
Real state per capita spending on public health also supports our hypothesis. The
relationship between AMT coverage and public health spending is uniformly negative, and it is
statistically significant once attention is restricted to AMT filers earning more than $75,000
annually. Our results imply that real state per capita public health spending would decline by
almost 19 percent if the share of filers covered by the AMT making more than $50,000 were to
increase by one standard deviation. Restricting attention to those making more than $200,000,
the expected decline is around 50 percent.
Despite the fact that data limitations generate significant precision problems, we find
robust support for our hypothesis that as AMT coverage increases, state spending on social
insurance programs declines conditional on state per capita income. This evidence is consistent
with our claim that the AMT acts as a fiscal stabilizer.
B. Local Spending
Our general argument applies to local government spending in addition to state
government spending. Unfortunately, data availability constraints force us to restrict attention to
the period 2004-2006 for any local expenditure analysis. Further, it is generally the case that
local expenditure figures will be noisier than state figures. With this in mind, we expect that
local expenditure analyses will be significantly less precise and should be viewed descriptively.
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Local government expenditure data for the same spending categories are available from
the U.S. Census Bureau.183 Table 7 provides descriptive statistics for local spending in the areas
of education, welfare, hospitals, and public health.
Table 7
Descriptive Statistics for Local Government Spending
Variable
Description
Mean
St. Dev.
Spending
Real Local
1,114
255
Government Spending
Per Capita on
Education, Welfare,
Hospitals, and Public
Health
Education
Real Local
863
160
Spending
Government Spending
Per Capita on
Education
Welfare
Real Local
74
82
Spending
Government Spending
Per Capita on Welfare
Hospital
Real Local
106
73
Spending
Government Spending
Per Capita on Hospitals
Health Spending Real Local
61
45
Government Spending
Per Capita on Public
Health
Note: Sample covers 2004-2006; all variables weighted by state population.

Source
Census

Census

Census

Census

Census

In Table 8, we provide estimates of the effect of AMT coverage on total real per capita
local government spending.
Table 8
AMT Coverage and Local Spending Per Capita
(Standard Errors Clustered at the State Level in Parentheses)
[Standard Errors Multi-Way Clustered at the State and Year Level in Brackets]
AMT Share

183

-16
(3427)
[2639]

http://www.census.gov/govs/www/estimate.html
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AMT Share
50k+

-197
(1274)
[915]

AMT Share
75k+

-163
(793)
[559]

AMT Share
100k+

-101
(480)
[340]

AMT Share
200k+

-84
(254)
[276]

0.040
0.039
0.040
0.041
0.041
(0.020)*
(0.020)*
(0.021)*
(0.021)*
(0.023)*
[0.018]**
[0.018]**
[0.018]**
[0.019]**
[0.021]**
Note: Sample covers 2004-2006. All regressions are estimated with population weights. All
regressions include state and year fixed effects.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 (against a two sided test of the null hypothesis of no effect).
Income

As expected, we again find uniformly negative relationships between real local
government spending per capita, but data limitations lead to very low precision. Interestingly,
the relative effects estimated here are only about 20 percent as large as those estimated for state
spending. Although we do not report results by category for local spending, we find that the
difference between the state and local results is driven by the education and welfare categories
where very little relationship between spending and AMT coverage is observed, whereas the
coefficients for local hospital and public health spending are comparable to those observed in the
state spending data.
Although not as strong as the state spending results, these local spending estimates are
also largely supportive of our hypothesis that the AMT changes the price of local government
spending as it is perceived by taxpayers, especially those with higher incomes, and this translates
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to observable changes in local spending patterns in social insurance categories. This suggests
that the AMT does function as an automatic fiscal stabilizer, inducing more local government
spending during economic downturns and limiting it during times of economic growth.
VII. Tweaking State and Federal Tax to Improve Stability
So far we have set out the theoretical appeal of the AMT as an automatic stabilizer for
state budgets. It cannot have escaped the reader’s attention, though, that notwithstanding our
theory, states continue to experience financial crises. Our data imply that these crises have been
milder as a result of the AMT. We acknowledge, however, that there are at least two important
practical obstacles limiting the full efficacy of the AMT’s stabilization function. For one thing,
taxpayers must actually be aware that their deduction has been restored in order for any
preferences for higher taxes to register at the ballot box. And taxpayers may anticipate that their
earnings will soon rise, so that they may believe that any relief from AMT will be short-lived. In
this Part we explore these points in more detail, and set out a handful of policy options for
mitigating them.
A. Problems Translating Federal Subsidies to State Revenues
It could be argued that the AMT is not truly an automatic stabilizer for state budgets
because it does not directly increase state revenues. Instead, as federal tax deductions for state
taxes paid reduce the price of local spending relative to other available uses of taxpayers’
personal funds, voters are more willing to vote for tax rate increases, or to give political support
to officials who increase tax rates.184
1. Voter Ignorance of AMT Liability
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One such translational problem may be that voters may not take federal deductibility into
account in forming their opinions about local tax policy.185 Taxpayers who did not take a
deduction in a prior year because of the AMT may be unaware that the deduction will become
available when the AMT no longer applies. Others may simply be uncertain whether they will
be subject to AMT until they (or their preparer) calculates both standard and AMT liability the
following April 15.186 Even those who can easily do the tax computation themselves may be
unsure of their earnings between the time of a relevant political decision and the end of the tax
year. Yet other taxpayers may simply fail to take available information into account.187 For
instance, in laboratory studies, subjects had difficult integrating in their heads the combined
effects of two overlapping tax systems.188 It is unclear to what extent these laboratory studies
capture real-world behavior.189
Of course, officials can always simply attempt to educate voters when proposing tax
increases, but counter-intuitively, many ordinary efforts to inform voters about the effects of the
AMT have the potential to reduce overall political support. Educational efforts may increase
support for taxes among some voters,190 but should also increase lobbying efforts by those
opposed to tax. To understand why, consider a world in which voters have complete information
about one another’s finances. Voters ordinarily free ride on one another’s lobbying efforts, so
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that only extreme outliers, such as the super-rich, will themselves lobby.191 However, in a
downturn, some voters will drop out of the AMT and become more supportive of tax increases.
This means that rich voters still subject to AMT cannot free ride on the efforts of the dropouts.
Accordingly, if rich voters are aware of how many others are no longer subject to AMT, they can
calibrate their own lobbying efforts upwards to make up for the shortfall.192 As a result, in the
presence of the AMT the SALT deduction would not increase overall political support for tax
increases.193
In the real world voters do not have full information about one another, but that
knowledge deficit in turn limits the efficacy of efforts to inform voters about the SALT
deduction. If wealthy voters cannot observe the extent to which others in their jurisdiction can
claim the SALT deduction (and would prefer higher local tax rates), they do not know that they
should ratchet up their own lobbying efforts.194 However, when public officials undertake
widely observable efforts to inform voters about the effects of the SALT deduction, they also
provide information to wealthy voters. The fact that the officials are bothering with education
efforts implies that the officials have private information about the existence of SALT-eligible
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voters in the jurisdiction. And the scope and effectiveness of the education campaign can be a
surrogate source of information about increased support for tax hikes: the wealthy voters can
calibrate their own increased lobbying to match the education campaign. Thus, on net efforts to
educate voters about their own SALT eligibility may simply increase opposition to tax rate
increases among ineligible segments of the body politic.
General educative efforts are also likely ineffective where the problem is the voter’s
uncertainty about whether she will have AMT liability. Most taxpayers file their returns for a
given year in March or April of the following year.195 Over ten million more obtain extensions
and file even later.196 As a result, at the time of a proposed tax increase, a voter may be
uncertain what her income will be between the vote and the end of the year, and thus unsure
about the effects of the AMT. This problem may be mitigated somewhat if the tax increase is
supported by officials who need not stand for election until after the next income tax filing
season. But there are no data to tell us whether voters will remember to evaluate their official
based on the net-of-federal-tax cost of any tax increases, or instead will remember only their
anger at the time of the tax rate increase itself.
2. Voter Ignorance Also Affects Exit
AMT effects play out a bit differently for exit constraints on state tax-setting. Recall that
in addition to voter opposition, the threat of taxpayer exit in response to tax hikes is also a
significant source of downward pressure on state and local tax rates. Indeed, some
commentators argue that, because of free riding, voting is relatively unimportant, and that exit
(or the credible threat of exit) is the most meaningful constraint on local officials.197
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When taxpayers drop out of AMT liability, exit should decrease. The SALT deduction
makes exit less attractive at the margin, because it narrows the taxpayer’s perceived gap between
the cost of living in a jurisdiction and the benefits received from that choice.198 If this gap
dwindles to below the costs of exit, the taxpayer will not move. Thus, as more taxpayers in a
jurisdiction gain the benefits of the SALT deduction, their inclination to relocate will drop. The
same is true, to a rather lesser degree, of the home equity deduction. As taxpayers drop out of
AMT, and regain access to the home equity deduction, it becomes relatively more attractive for
them to remain in their present home than to move to a new one with no built-up equity.
Again, however, these effects are subject to taxpayers’ awareness of the effect of the
SALT deduction. Once more, efforts to educate the public might also trigger increased lobbying
efforts by those who do not benefit. If exit constraints strongly dominate any lobbying effects,
then state education efforts might free officials to raise tax rates. But whether that is true is not
clearly predicted by theory and has not been measured empirically.
3. Taxpayers Anticipate Later Tax Increases
A final problem that arises under either voting or exit is the possibility that taxpayers will
anticipate future AMT liability. If the SALT deduction is available only because the taxpayer’s
income has fallen due to a temporary condition, such as unemployment or underemployment,
then the taxpayer may expect (or at least hope) that in the future income will rise again. In that
case, the taxpayer may ignore the present lower effective tax rate and vote according to her
expected, higher, future rate.199 Movers may not relocate until the higher effective rate actually
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kicks in, but if the jurisdiction and its officials want to avoid a later exodus, they must
themselves anticipate the results of the AMT.
An obvious fix to the anticipation problem is to make countercyclical tax increases
temporary, but this fix may not be fully effective. For one thing, it is not clear that officials can
credibly commit themselves to roll back rates or let temporary tax hikes expire.200 Again, the
problem is that the political cost of failing to lower rates will fall on future officials, while the
gains of meeting the budget crisis are realized immediately. In addition, there is a status quo bias
in legislation: it is harder to enact change than defend existing legislation.201 That will tend to
make it difficult to adjust rates downward again.202 While rate increases that automatically
expire do not face that difficulty, they present the different one that they may expire before the
state’s fiscal hardship is over.
4. Residual Benefits of AMT
Having said all of this, we should note that the AMT offers some stabilization benefits
irrespective of whether federal subsidies translate to higher tax rates. At a minimum, lower
federal taxes for regions suffering from a downturn means higher after-tax wealth for those
regions. In effect, the AMT targets tax cuts to regions where economic stimulus is needed. In
addition to this income effect, the deductibility of sales taxes and home-equity loans creates
substitution effects in favor of spending --- assuming, at least, that consumers believe they will
not be subject to AMT for the year in which they make their purchase.
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Federal subsidies also offer some support for state revenues even if tax rates do not
increase. If retail sales increase, then retail sales revenues do, too. And capitalization of the netof-tax cost of the local tax burden may increase home values, adding to property tax proceeds.
B. Some Policy Possibilities
So far we have argued that the AMT already produces a modest stabilization effect. In
this subpart we suggest some fairly simple (if in some cases counter-intuitive) ways in which
states themselves can make better use of federal subsidies during downturns, and some tweaks to
federal law that would further improve the AMT’s stabilizer function.
1. Tax the Middle Class
The first tool states can adopt for themselves is to target their tax rate increases to
individuals who are unlikely to have AMT liability. Remember that the central political problem
for states is that wealthy AMT-payers are likely to increase their own lobbying efforts in
response to evidence that other citizens are willing to pay higher taxes. But this problem only
arises if the same tax rates are applied to both AMT-payers and those who receive federal
subsidy. If rates are increased only for subsidy recipients, the AMT-payers have no reason to
lobby. 203 Indeed, they are likely to be happy to receive some additional government services for
free.
Precise targeting of the state’s tax increase may be difficult, but proxies are readily
available. In theory a state income tax could well include a discount for those who pay federal
AMT. The worry here would be that the existence of this special discount would be far less
salient politically than the general rate increase, leading some AMT-payers nonetheless to
oppose the rate hike. As a second-best, though, the state could simply calculate the income
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threshold for most local AMT payers, and limit its rate increase to those below that threshold.
Similarly, though there is no obvious way to limit property tax rates for those who pay AMT, a
substitute (admittedly, inexact) would be to increase rates only on homes below a certain value.
Sales taxes present a thornier targeting problem, but that probably doesn’t matter. Sales
taxes can be crudely calibrated to fall less heavily on the poor by adjusting which items are
subject to tax, as by taxing only luxuries or exempting bare necessities.204 But it is difficult to
conceive of how to do the opposite: there are few meaningfully large categories of items that are
purchased only by low- and middle-income persons and not the wealthy.205 However, the
wealthy pay a relatively low portion of their incomes in sales taxes.206 Thus, the failure to
exempt AMT-payers from higher sales tax rates probably would not significantly increase
political opposition to the increase.
We acknowledge that of course this approach of exempting the wealthy from higher rates
looks to be squarely contrary to most accounts of distributive justice and fair progressivity in the
tax system.207 That appearance is somewhat misleading, though. First, state rates net of federal
tax may change only slightly, as we have explained.208 Second, countercyclical expenditures
disproportionately benefit lower-income residents.209 Taking into account both taxing and
spending the targeted rate increases and associated higher spending may be net beneficial to the
state’s poorest, and not as negative for the middle class as a first glance would suggest.210
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Finally, states could mitigate the regressivity of any targeting policy by also exempting very lowincome taxpayers, granting property-tax exemptions for landlords of low-income housing, and
avoiding sales tax hikes on essentials such as food and medicine.
2. Exploit the Natural Salience of Filing Season
Next, both state and federal law could build on the public’s increased awareness of the
tax system around April 15 each year. We have hypothesized that voters’ failure to connect
higher state taxes with lower federal taxes might limit the efficacy of the SALT deduction. By
enacting increases around April 15, when most taxpayers are filing their federal tax return, states
could help voters to keep federal effects in mind when they form opinions about the state
proposal. One recent study of tax incentives, for example, found that federal deductions are
much more effective in changing consumer behavior around April 15 than other times of year.211
This approach is superior to a more general education campaign, because it is unlikely to
induce higher lobbying efforts by AMT payers. The timing of a tax increase proposal reveals
little of officials’ information about the number of voters who will receive the SALT deduction.
And AMT payers cannot substitute for that information with the intensity of the education
campaign.
On the federal side, Congress might transplant a procedure already used for contributions
to individual retirement accounts, and enact a statute permitting sales tax incurred between
January 1 and April 15 of Year Two to be deductible from the taxpayer’s Year One tax return.212
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Under current law, only taxes paid during the applicable tax year are deductible.213 The problem,
as we have shown, is that consumers may not know until the following April whether the sales
taxes they pay will end up being deductible, which greatly reduces the value of the deduction as
an incentive to consume. If sales tax were retroactively deductible, consumers would be able to
be certain they were not subject to AMT before making major purchases.214
3. Guarantee Deductibility
Turning to the problem of anticipated future AMT liability, we have argued that states
cannot likely make credible pledges to reduce taxes when crises pass, so federal intervention is
needed. The difficulty, again, is that deductibility may not make a present tax increase more
appealing if the taxpayer expects that her income will soon increase, making her subject to AMT
and eliminating the deduction. Our proposed solution, then, is to make tax increases AMTprotected. That is, Congress could guarantee that a deduction that benefits a taxpayer this year
will still benefit her next year, or potentially years after that.
In essence, the way this would work is that the Tax Code would allow a taxpayer who
benefitted from the SALT deduction in a prior tax year to reduce her AMT income by the
amount of state and local tax attributable to a recent tax rate increase. So, to illustrate, suppose a
taxpayer who was not subject to AMT in Year One. Also in Year One, Residence State
increases its income tax by 2%, from 3% to 5%. In Year Two, when our taxpayer calculates her
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tentative AMT liability, she can deduct two-fifths of her state income taxes from her AMT
income.
Whether this protection would last only one year, or would be extended to future years as
well, should depend on empirical research into the extent to which taxpayers anticipate future
AMT liability when they respond to the SALT deduction. However, we would be inclined to
limit protection to a relatively short time. The longer the guarantee extends, the more it
resembles an undifferentiated federal subsidy for state taxes. We have argued that the AMT is
appealing precisely because it is not such a subsidy.
The implementation of this proposal would also help to educate taxpayers about the
SALT deduction. In order to compute their AMT liability, taxpayers would need to know their
state tax rates, as well as any recent changes in state rates. Thus, we would require states to
provide their taxpayers with this information in a short form, much like the Form 1099 notices
taxpayers routinely receive from their banks, scholarship providers, and investment brokers.215
States could take the opportunity to indicate not only their nominal marginal rates, but also the
average effective tax rate net of federal deductibility.
4. Target State Education Efforts
Finally, a relatively small-bore but potentially effective technique for increasing the
political effectively of SALT deductions would be for states to aim their educational efforts only
to likely SALT beneficiaries. In this way, again, AMT payers could not easily observe the scope
of educational efforts and would not be prompted to increase their own lobbying effort. For
example, states could include explanations of the SALT deduction in the materials it provides to
applicants for unemployment insurance or other new social insurance benefits applicants. These
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individuals are the most likely to have low or declining incomes that might signify disappearing
AMT liability. Similarly, if property tax rates will increase only for homes below a certain
value, the jurisdiction could provide advance notice of a proposed rate increase to those homes
together with SALT and AMT education.
VIII. Conclusion
The AMT is, we admit, an unlikely place to find a solution to the problem of state finance
in times of crisis.216 We have argued, though, that each of the more obvious candidates has
serious flaws. States cannot tax, borrow, or save enough to meet their residents’ needs for social
insurance. Other federal supports lead to moral hazard, are wasteful, or are too poorly timed to
be effective. Thus automatic stabilizers assume an important role in smoothing incomes. And,
as we have shown empirically, the AMT is a powerful automatic stabilizer.
Accordingly, we would resist efforts to repeal or “patch” the AMT.217 Instead, we
suggest that greater attention to the details of the AMT, and the tax lawmaking process that
surrounds it, can greatly improve state responsiveness to recessions. We have noted some
preliminary possibilities here, but no doubt others could add to our list.
Even for those who reject our arguments about the usefulness of the AMT as automatic
stabilizer, our empirics themselves are worth some attention. We have demonstrated that the
existence of the AMT very likely curtails state spending in several important categories. For
those who would prefer to see greater state support for education, health, and aid to the poor
irrespective of the business cycle, we offer evidence that the AMT should be repealed.
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Our data are also relevant to other academic debates. For example, we provide evidence
in favor of Professor Listokin’s general model of the tax code as automatic stabilizer. Our data
also suggest that the deductibility of state and local taxes positively affects state spending, a
point of controversy among several prominent economists.218 Finally, we contribute to the
literature on tax salience by showing that higher-income taxpayers are more likely to anticipate
their own future AMT liability and translate that knowledge into political action.

[23,805]

218

For description of the controversy and summary of the existing data, see supra note 156.

68

